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Accessing Tax Accrual Workpapers
United States v. Arthur Young & Co.
STEVEN

A.

DIMENGO

The status of an independent auditor's workpapers when summoned by
the Service was uncertain until the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Arthur Young & Co. ' The major issue of the proceedings was whether tax accrual workpapers, prepared by a taxpayer's independent auditor during the
course of an annual audit, were subject to disclosure to the Service pursuant to
a summons under Section 7602 of the Code.' The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the broad summoning power of the Service which is necessary to enforce the
country's self-assessment, federal taxation system.' Accordingly, tax accrual
workpapers are required to be disclosed due to their relevance to an IRS inquiry within in the meaning of Section 7602.1
In Arthur Young, while auditing Amerada Hess Corporation's tax return,
the Service directed Young to produce over a quarter of a million pages of
audit workpapers, including the tax accrual workpapers accumulated in the
audit of Amerada.5 The Service's authority for the request was Section 7602.6
After Young did not comply with the summons, the district court held that
Young must relinquish the tax accrual workpapers to the Service.7 The audit
program and other audit workpapers were not ordered to be disclosed because
they were less relevant to the investigation of Amerada's tax returns
The appellate court found all of the audit workpapers to be relevant to
Amerada's tax liability.' However, the court feared the financial statements
would become inaccurate due to lack of management candor if tax accrual
workpapers were easily accessible. The appellate court, therefore, created an
accountant work-product privilege, 0 which, under these facts, prevented the
Service from obtaining the tax accrual work papers due to an insufficient
'104 S.Ct. 1495 (1984).
2I.R.C. §7602 (1982). See Note, Internal Revenue Service Review of Tax Accrual Workpapers: United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 18 AKRON L. REV. 165 (1984).
'Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1502.
'Id. at 1501-02.
'United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 215. (2d Cir. 1982).
'Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1498. Section 7602, in pertinent part, provides that the Service has the right to review
any documents that may be relevant to an inquiry concerning the correctness of a person's tax liability.
I.R.C. §7602.
'United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
1Id. at 1157-60.
9Young, 677 F.2d at 212.
"The privilege was modeled after the attorney work-product privilege recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947).
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showing of need."
The Supreme Court ruled that the Service can summon tax accrual
workpapers.' 2 The Court analyzed the specific wording of Section 7602 and
determined that the language "may be relevant" equips the Service with a
broad summoning power of items even potentially relevant. 3 The Court rejected the policy argument concerning the potential for lack of candor between
management and the auditor leading to inaccurate financial statements."' The
auditor cannot be content with management representations. He must ascertain the validity of the tax accrual reserves for himself. 5
The Court failed to recognize an accountant work-product privilege, leaving Section 7602 to be limited by Congress, which has failed to act. 6 Section
7602 is subject to only the traditional limitations and privileges. Federal law
recognizes no confidential accountant relationship. 7 The Court noted that
confidentiality is not essential to the relationship. 8 Unlike in the attorneyclient relationship, the auditor is not an advocate for his client. The auditor
merely determines if his client has made the required disclosures in the financial statements. 9 The Court views the auditor as the public watchdog. He must
be totally independent, owing complete fidelity to the public trust."
Although easy access to tax accrual workpapers may impede the audit
process, the Supreme Court does recognize that there are limits to the summoning power to be kept within its reasonable bounds.2' For example, the summoning power of the Service cannot be used for a criminal investigation." Furthermore, only the federal courts can enforce an Internal Revenue Service
summons since it is not self-executing. 3 Finally, the Supreme Court notes that
any alternative to the present system of Internal Revenue Service investigation
would involve a substantially greater invasion of the taxpayer's privacy.',

"Young, 677 F.2d at 22 1.
"Young, 104 S.Ct. at 1497.
"Id. at 1501. The Court further noted that the key for accessibility is that the summoned documents might
throw light upon the correctness of the taxpayer's return. Id.
"Id. at 1503.
1Id.
"Id. at 1502.

"See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
"Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503.
191d.

201d.
"United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
"See United States v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314, (1978).
23See I.R.C. §7604 (1982).
1"Young,

104 S.Ct. at 1502 (quoting Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146).
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Dickman v. Commissioner and Code Section 7872
ANN

D.

FULMER

Prior to the 1984 Dickman v. Commissioner' decision, interest free demand loans made to family members did not constitute taxable events. In
Dickman, the Supreme Court held that such loans constitute taxable gifts to
the reasonable value of the use of the money lent.2
Between 1971 and 1976, Paul and Esther Dickman loaned substantial
amounts of money to their son Lyle and to Artesian Farms, Inc., a closely held
company owned by the family.' With two exceptions, the loans were evidenced
by non-interest bearing demand notes.' During the period in question, the
loan's outstanding balances ranged from $68,651 to $699,733. 5
Paul Dickman died in 1976. After an audit of the estate, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the loans were taxable gifts to the
extent of the value of the use of the funds.6 The Commissioner issued notice of
a gift tax deficiency, valuing the loans by multiplying the outstanding balances
as of the end of each taxable quarter by interest rates taken from Internal
Revenue Code (Code) Section 662 1' Esther Dickman and the estate petitioned
the Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiency.'
The Tax Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Crown v. Commissioner,9
and held that interest-free intrafamily demand loans were not subject to the
federal gift tax.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the making of gratuitous interest-free demand notes
gives rise to gift tax liability." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
2
the resulting conflict between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts.
The Court reasoned that Code Section 2501(a)(1), which "imposes a tax
upon 'the transfer of property by gift,", reaches "any gratuitous transfer of

'104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984) rehg denied 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
Id. at 1094-95.
1Id. at 1088.
4
1d.

5Id.
1d.
'Id. at 1088, n. 2. The applicable rates ranged from six to nine percent per annum. Id.
11d. at 1089.
967 T.C. 1060 (1977), affd 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
1049 T.C.M. (P-H) 2424, 2428 (1980).
"Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 819 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
11d. at 1088.
"Id.
at 1089.
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any interest in property."'" The Court stated that the statute's plain language
imposes the gift tax on "all transfers of property and property rights having
significant value."' 5 The Court further reasoned that the gratuitous transfer of
the right to use money constitutes a transfer of property because of the
'6
transfer's "measurable economic value.'
The Court was concerned that allowing a transfer of property through an
interest-free demand loan mechanism would allow the transferor to avoid
future estate tax liability by removing the funds from the estate. 7 By imposing
a gift tax upon such transfers, a dimunution of the tranferor's estate would be
prevented. 8 The Court recognized that although the law allows an individual
to waste the use value of his funds, tax consequences "inevitably flow" under
Code Section 2501(a)(1) from the decision to transfer property by gift. 9
Section 172(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Act)0 confines the
application of the Dickman decision to past transactions. The Act added Code
Section 7872, providing that below-market loans which are in the nature of a
gift or demand loan are taxable to the lender as if the borrower had actually
paid the foregone interest." Such loans result in income to the lender, and an
interest deduction to the borrower. Code Section 7872 applies to below-market
rate gift loans, compensation-related loans, corporation-shareholder loans, and
loans with interest rate arrangements designed to avoid federal taxes." This
new Code section provides a "de minimis" exemption for direct loans to an individual which, in the aggregate, do not exceed $10,000.3 However, this exemption does not apply if the loan is attributable to the purchase or carrying of
income-producing assets.14 The valuation of the foregone interest is accomplished by applying the appropriate rate in effect under Code Section
1274(d), compounded semiannually. 5

'Id. The Court noted that Code Section 2511 (a) provides gift tax consequences where the gift is direct or indirect, and where -the property is real, personal, tangible or intangible. Id.
Ild. at 1089-90. Drawing an analogy to the broad interpretation of the reach of Code Section 61 (defining
gross income), the Court stated that absent an express exclusion, "any transfer meeting the statutory requirements must be held subject to the gift tax." Id. at n.4.
6
Id. at 1091.
"Id. at 1092.
"Id.
191d.
'Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 699 (1984).

11.R.C. §7872(a) (1984).
-1.R.C. §7872(c) (1984).
"1.R.C. §7872(c)(2)(A) (1984).
-'I.R.C. §7872(c)(2)(B) (1984).
-I.R.C. §7872(f)(2)(B) (1984). Code Section 1274(d) provides that interest will be computed based on the six
month average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining
maturity periods of three years or less. I.R.C. §1274(d)(1)(D) (1984).
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Constitutionalityof the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.
L. DECAMP
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) which created a pension plan termination insurance program administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC
is a government corporation designed to collect premiums and administer
coverage for insurance coverage for private retirement pension plans and to
provide benefits to participants if those plans terminate.' ERISA was originally
enacted to cover single employer plans. Coverage and payments by the PBGC
to multiemployer plans was not to become mandatory until January 1, 1978. 3
Between 1974 and January 1, 1978, the PBGC could exercise discretion in
paying these insurance proceeds to multiemployer plans. Congress eventually
realized that employers could terminate their multiemployer plans prior to the
enactment date and force the PBGC to assume these obligations." Therefore,
Congress enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980
(MPPAA) which made liability retroactive to April 29, 1980, thus preventing
employers from terminating plans prior to January 1, 1978, in hopes of getting
out of their obligations.'
CLIFFORD

R.A. Gray and Company is an Oregon construction company which contributed to a multiemployer pension plan called the Oregon-Washington Carpenters-Employers Pension Trust Fund.' R.A. Gray and Company withdrew
from the pension plan on June 1, 1980, and the pension plan's trustees assessed
the company with a withdrawal penalty of $201,359, which they refused to
pay.7 Gray and Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the PBGC
and the pension plan.' Gray and Company sought to have the retroactive application of the MPPAA declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
fifth amendment.' Gray and Company further contended that the

104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
11d. at 2713.
'Id.
1d. at 2713-14.
'Id. at 2715.
'Id. at 2715-16.
'ld. at 2716.
'Id
1d.
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Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act was arbitrary and irrational in
attempting to provide retroactive application of its provisions, and impaired
Gray's collective bargaining agreements."
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found against
Gray and Company." In coming to its decision, the district court decided the
issue of whether the MPPAA was arbitrary and irrational by applying the test
developed in Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.2 This test
has four factors. The first factor is the reliance interests of the parties. The second is whether the interest impaired was in an area previously subjected to
regulatory control. The third concerns the equities of imposing legislative
burdens on the employers. The last is whether there were provisions in the law
that would limit or modify the impact of the burden that was imposed. 3 The
district court looked to these factors and decided that the employees' reliance
on the promised pension benefits outweighed Gray's reliance. 4 Additionally,
the court did not find that the retroactive nature of the MPPAA was an irrational solution to the situation. 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision
applying the same four factor test." That court decided that the MPPAA did
violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by impairing Gray and
Company's right to the collective bargaining agreement. 7 Additionally, they
found that the MPPAA also placed too great a burden on the employer.'8
The Supreme Court in a decision written by Justice Brennan, reversed the
Ninth Circuit decision and found that the test developed in the Nachman case
was unconstitutional and not to be applied. The Court stated that legislation
under review by the Court has a strong presumption of constitutionality, 9
even when it is applied retroactively. 0 The Court further stated that Congress
had considered the competing interests when it decided to enact the MPPAA.
Furthermore, the Court stated that it would not substitute its judgment for
decisions made by Congress. 1 Therefore, the Court found that there was a ra' 0R.A. Gray & Co. v. Oregon-Washington Carpenters-Employers Pension Trust Fund, 549 F. Supp. 531,
534 (D. Or. 1982).
1id. at 533.
12592 F. 2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979).

"Id. at 960.
14549 F. Supp. at 537.
"Id. at 538.
.6705 F. 2d 1502, 1511-14 (9th Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 1513.
"Id. at 1514.
"1104 S. Ct. at 2717.
"Id. at 2718.
I'd. at 2718-19.
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tional purpose in applying the retroactive application of the law, in order to
prevent employers from withdrawing when they faced the possibility of higher
contributions." Congress had correctly concluded that mass movement of
employers in this manner could destabilize the whole program and had sought
to prevent such a thing from happening. 3
By failing to address the rationality of the legislative act, the Court reaffirmed its policy of deference to Congress when reviewing legislation. Thus it
would appear that in the area of pension legislation, Congress reigns supreme.
In keeping with this, Congress repealed the retroactive provisions of the
MPPAA in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.4

22

1d. at 2719.
2id.
'Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 558. 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984).
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South Carolina v. Regan - Defining the Dimensions Of
The Anti-Injunction Act
STEVEN

A. D1MENGO

In South Carolina v. Regan', the Supreme Court ruled that the AntiInjunction Act (Act)2 barred only those suits where Congress has provided the
3
aggrieved party with an alternate avenue to contest the legality of a tax. Since
Congress did not grant South Carolina an alternate remedy to contest the
legality of the particular tax in question, the Act did not bar the suit. In South
Carolina v. Regan, South Carolina invoked the Courts original jurisdiction,
seeking an injunction and other relief." The complaint was filed against the
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The State claimed that Section
103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by Section 310(b)(1) of the
5
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) is unconstitutional.6 Section 103(a) exempts interest earned on the obligations of a state
from a taxpayer's gross income.7 However, to qualify for the exemption, the
obligation must be in registered form as opposed to bearer form.' South
Carolina argued that it was effectively denied the right to issue bearer bonds,
since investors would demand higher rates of interest on such bonds due to the
taxability of the interest.9 Accordingly, the State argued that its borrowing
power as thus restricted impaired its separate and independent existence."
South Carolina contended that such an impingement on the State's power
violates the Tenth Amendment." Avoiding the merits of the controversy, the
Secretary argued that South Carolina's action was barred by the Anti'104 S. Ct. 1107 (1984).
'1.R.C. §7421. Section 7421(a) provides:
(a) Tax-Except as provided in Sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c), 7426(a) and (b)(l),
and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed Id.
'Regan, 104 S. Ct. at I I 11.
'Id. at 1110.
'Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 596 (1982).
6Id.
'1.R.C. §103(a).
'Section 201(b)91) of TEFRA added I.R.C. §1031) which provides:

"(U)obligations must be in registered form to be tax-exempt.
(i) In general - nothing in subsection (a) or in any other provision of law shall be construed to provide an exemption from federal income tax for interest on any registration-required obligation unless the obligation is
in registered form."
Id.Generally, a registration-required obligation is an obligation offered to the public with a maturity of

greater than one year. I.R.C. §103(j)(2).
'Regan, 104 S. Ct. at I11.
'Old.

"Id Furthermore, South Carolina argued that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is violated
by a tax on the interest earned on state obligations. Id.
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Injunction Act. I"
The Court analyzed the intent of the Act and determined that injunctions
were prohibited only when the statutory scheme provided an alternate remedy.
The Court rejected the Secretary's contention that Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co. Inc. 3 provides the only exception to the Act.'4 The
Court stated that Williams Packing was not relevant since the taxpayer had
the alternate remedy of a suit for a refund. 5 The Court noted that cases after
Williams Packing specifically focused on the availability of a refund suit to the
taxpayer when denying him injunctive relief.'6
The Court noted that Section 7478 of the Internal Revenue Code does not
provide South Carolina with an action to contest the constitutionality of taxing unregistered obligations of the state.'7 The Secretary argued that the State's
remedy lay in persuading a purchaser of its bearer bonds to contest the constitutionality of Section 310(b)(1) of TEFRA.8 The Court rejected this argument by stating "reliance on the remedy suggested by the Secretary would
create the risk that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State of
any opportunity to obtain review of its claims."19
Finally, the Court rejected the Secretary's argument that it should not invoke its original jurisdiction since another adequate forum existed.2" The Court
noted that Section 31 0(b)(1) would materially infringe upon South Carolina's
borrowing power.2' The Court stated: "[u]nquestionably, the manner in which
a State may exercise its borrowing power is a question of vital importance to all
fifty States."22
Although South Carolina v. Regan does not address the merits of the
State's claim, it clarifies the reach of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act applies
only when the suitor does not have alternate remedies.
121d.

'3370 U.S. 1 (1962).

'4Regan, 104 S. Ct. at I I i1. In Williams, the Court noted that the Act would not apply if the taxpayer could
demonstrate certain success on the merits and that irreparable harm would result from collection. Williams,
370 U.S. at 6-7.
"Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1112.
"Id. at 1112-13. The Court analyzed Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Alexander v.
Americans United Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); and United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419
U.S. 7 (1974). Furthermore, the Court noted that the 1966 amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was not
relevant to the issue before the Court. The amendment addressed the rights of third parties whose property
rights competed with federal tax liens. The amendment granted the third parties a right of action against the
federal government. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1113-14.
"Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1117.
"1d.at 1115.
19d.
"ld. at 1116.
211d.

2Id.
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Amendments to FraudulentReturns
Badaraccov. Commissioner
ANN

D.

FULMER

In Badaracco v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court held that Internal
Revenue Code (Code) Section 6501(c)(1) allows the Service to assess taxes at
any time on fraudulent returns, even if the returns have later been amended by
nonfraudulent returns.
Code Section 6501(a) provides a three year statute of limitations for the
assessment of taxes, and prohibits the initiation of court proceedings to collect
such taxes without assessment after that period of time has elapsed. Section
6501 (c)(1) provides an exception to that rule, stating: "[iln the case of a false or
fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time. '
Ernest Badaracco, Sr., and Ernest Badaracco, Jr., filed fraudulent partnership and individual returns [for] the years 1965 through 1969.1 While under investigation by a federal grand jury in 1971, the taxpayers filed nonfraudulent
amended returns for the years in question." Both men were indicted for filing
false and fraudulent returns, and they later plead guilty in respect to the
returns filed for 1967.1
In 1977, the Commissioner issued deficiency notices on account of fraud
of the tax years in question, amounting to fifty percent of the undereach
for
payment of the basic tax., The taxpayers sought redetermination of the
asserted deficiencies and claimed that the Commissioner's action was barred by
Code Section 6501(a). The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayers,' but the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' Because of a conflict in the circuits,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court looked to the "unqualified language" of Section
1104 S.Ct. 756 (1984).
'I.R.C. §6501(c)(I).
104 S. Ct. at 759.
Id.
The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. Id.
'Id.
'104 S.Ct. at 759-60. The Commissioner asserted liability under Code Section 6653(b), the so-called "fraud
penalty." Id.at 760.
1104 S. Ct. at 760.
942 T.C.M. 573 (P-H) 81, 404 (1981).
'693 F.2d 298 (3rd Cir. 1982).
10103 S.Ct. 2084 (1983).
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6501(c)(1), and noted that nothing in the statute "can be construed to suspend
its operation in... light of a fraudulent filer's subsequent repentant conduct.""
Furthermore, by its wording, Section 6501(a) fails to indicate that a taxpayer
can cause the three year statute of limitations to be reinstated by filing an
amended return. 2 The Court stated that to hold otherwise would allow taxpayers to file fraudulent returns in the hopes that the fraud would not be
discovered, and then, if discovered, to pay only the tax originally owed, thus
making the fraud penalty a nullity.' 3
The Court rejected the Badaraccos' argument that their original returns,
to the extent they were fraudulent, were made nullities for the purpose of applying Section 6501(a) because of the filing of the nonfraudulent amended
returns. The Court stated that "the return" referred to in that section is the
original return, and that an amended return does not become "the return"
upon filing." The Court noted that proving fraud is an area of great difficulty
for the Commissioner, and since the records underlying the filed return may
also be false or have been destroyed, more time is needed to complete an investigation." Furthermore, although an amended return may ultimately prove
to be accurate, it "comes with no greater guarantee of trustworthiness than
any other submission.... [as it] comes from a taxpayer who already has made
false statements. .. "I"The Court noted that the three year period may not provide sufficient time for the Commissioner to prove fraudulent intent. 7 Thus,
Section 6501(c)(1)'s "at any time" provision is the appropriate standard for
assessing taxes in the case of fraudulent returns.

1104 S. Ct. at 761. (fn. omitted).
12104 S. Ct. at 762.
131d.
"104 S. Ct. at 763-64.
1"104 S. Ct. at 764.
WId.
11104 S. Ct. at 765.
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Interest Payments On Promissory Notes For Clifford Trusts
Strimling v. Commissioner
ANNETTE SKINNER

In Strimling v. Commissioner,I the Tax Court held that interest paid on
promissory notes used to establish clifford trusts constitutes nondeductible
gifts rather than deductible interest payments. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion.'
Ten sets of parents (all Nevada residents) established clifford trusts for the
benefit of their children. Each of these trusts was funded with $10.00 and the
taxpayers' promissory notes, ranging from $10,000 to $85,000, made payable
to the trustees.3 The taxpayers claimed deductions for the interest payments
made on the notes under I.R.C. Section 163(a). The IRS filed a deficiency
notice disallowing these deductions.
The Tax Court relied on previous cases4 to hold that interest paid on an
unenforceable obligation is not deductible,5 and further relied on Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch' to state that whether an obligation is legally enforceable is a question of state law.7 Under Nevada law, the donee of a promissory note cannot enforce the gift against a donor.' The taxpayers contended
that although there was no consideration from the donees, the trustees'
assumption of fiduciary duties constituted a substitute for consideration and
thereby rendered the notes enforceable.9 The Tax Court found no support for
this proposition and, relying on Nevada law, held that a promise to do what
one is already legally bound to do does not constitute valid consideration.' The
court concluded that since the taxpayers' notes were not legally enforceable in
Nevada, the interest payments were wholly gratuitous and therefore not
deductible under I.R.C. Section 163(a)."

152 T.C.M. (P-H)

1 83,281 (1983).

'Strimling v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1984).
352 T.C.M. (P-H)

83,281.

'Linder v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 792, 796 (1977); Brown v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 920 (1956), affd 241
F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1957); Day v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 109 (1940), affd 121 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1941).

'52 T.C.M. (P-H)

83,281.

6387 U.S. 456 (1957).

'52 T.C.M. (P-H)

1 83,281.

Id.
91d.
0d.
"Id.
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Section 162(aX3) Deduction Of Gift-Leaseback Rental Payment
May v. Commissioner
CHERLYN PHERIGO

In what the court described as "a typical 'gift-leaseback' situation,"' the
Ninth Circuit has affirmed the deductibility, as a business expense, of rental
payments made to a trust established by the taxpayer for the benefit of his
children.' The taxpayers, Dr. May and his wife, by deed transferred their entire
interest in a medical building to an irrevocable trust with their four children as
beneficiaries. Dr. May continued to conduct his practice in the building as a
lessee and paid the trust a monthly rental. When the May's deducted the rent
paid as an ordinary and necessary business expense, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency.3 The Tax Court held that the payments
were deductible under I.R.C. Section 162(a)(3).
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied almost exclusively on its
opinion in Brooke v. United States,5 a 1972 case allowing a similar giftleaseback deduction. In Brooke the court stated that "[tihe fundamental issue
presented involves the sufficiency of the property interest transferred. 6 The
factors used to test the sufficiency of the transfer are: (1) the duration of the
transfer, (2) the controls retained by the donor, (3) the use of the gift property
for the benefit of the donor, and (4) the independence of the trustees.7
The May court, applying the Brooke test, found that the property interest
transferred was sufficient to allow a Section 162(a)(3) deduction The court
found that the written trust instrument used by Dr. May and his wife in 1971
effectively and irrevocably transferred title gratuitously to their children in
trust.9 It contained language plainly showing the transferor's present intent to
transfer as required by California law.' 0 In addition, the court held that the taxpayers "did not retain substantially the same control over the property" as they
'May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
'Id.
376 T.C. 7, 11 (1981).
'Id. at 15. All references are to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. sections 1 et. seg., including all
amendments or revisions thereto. Section 162(a)(3) permits the deduction of ordinary and necessary business
rental expenses.
1468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972). In Brooke the taxpayer/physician also conveyed his medical building to his
children as a gift. The taxpayer was appointed guardian of his children's estate and paid himself, as guardian,
the reasonable rental value of his medical offices. The rent was used for his children's health, education, and
insurance expenses. Id.
'Id. at 1157.
'Id. (citing Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976)).
1723 F.2d at 1436-37.
'Id at 1437.
10d.
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had before the gift in trust, and that the trustees were "sufficiently independent.""1 Finally, the court held that the gift property was not used for the benefit
of Dr. May. His use was "strictly as a lessee" according to the oral lease between himself and the trust. 2 Since the circumstances warranted taxing the
rental income to the trust, and the situation was not a "sham or a fraud,"' 3 the
court ruled that the deduction must be allowed.
The significance of the May decision is that it affirmed that the Ninth Circuit's "business purpose" analysis. The court will first determine the validity of
the transfer of the property and then allow a deduction if the leaseback rental
payments alone have a business purpose. 4 Only the leaseback must be
"grounded in professional or economic reality." The gift portion need not be
for a business purpose. 5 The Commissioner's position is that the gift and
language of Section 162 requires
leaseback are inseparable events, and that the
16
both to have been ordinary and necessary.
In conclusion, unless the circuit requires that even the gift portion of a
gift-leaseback have a business purpose, or that the two transactions are inseparable, the rental payments made to a trust will be deductible under Section
162(a)(3) if the Brooke criteria are met.

"Id.Dr. May and a friend, Harlos Gross, were the trustees. Gross, whose duties consisted of making quarterly inquiries to establish that the rent had been paid, testified that he felt independent of Dr. May. 76 T.C. at
14-15. The Tax Court agreed. Id.
1723 F.2d at 1437.
"Id. (quoting Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1158).
14723

F.2d at 1436. This analysis is also used by the 3rd, 7th and 8th circuits. Id. at fn. 2.

5d.

"Section 162 requires, by its wording, that the lease have a business purpose. The Commissioner's position is
also the position taken by the 4th and 5th Circuits. Id.
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Perjury Provision: United States v. Greenburg
MARK

A.

GIANCARLI

Recent circuit courts of appeals decisions have given the Section 7206(1)
perjury provision a great deal of bite along with its bark,' by providing for prosecution even where false statements on a return do not result in the underpayment of tax.
Section 7206(1) subjects "any person who willfully makes and subscribes
any return ... under the penalties of perjury. .. which he does not believe to
be true and correct as to every material matter . . ." to criminal prosecution,

fines up to $100,000 for individuals,2 and/or imprisonment of up to 3 years.3
In the most recent decision interpreting Section 7206(1), the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court decision that convicted Jack Greenburg, an accountant, of 3 counts of filing a false return. Greenburg was sentenced to a
prison term of one year and one day.'
In 1978, Greenburg, a participant in a joint venture, caused personal expenses to be classified as business expenditures and caused compensation
payments to co-venturers or business investment payments to be classified as
loans. Despite these misallocations, the joint venture accurately reported its
net taxable income and no tax deficiency resulted. Also in 1976 and 1977,
Greenburg overreported his wife's income arAi underreported his own. These
misallocations resulted in an understatement of only forty-eight dollars.
Greenburg argued first that the question of materiality was an issue for the
jury and secondly that the misstatements were not material because they
resulted in minimal underpayments. 5
The Court rejected both arguments, concluding:
that materiality was a question of law to be decided by the court .... [and]
the purpose *of§7206(1) is not simply to ensure that the taxpayer pay the
proper amount of taxes.... Rather, that section is intended to ensure also
that the taxpayer not make misstatements that could hinder the Internal
Revenue Service ... in carrying out such functions as the verification of

the accuracy of that return or a related tax return.
1

United States v. Greenburg, 735 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Whyte, 699 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Strand, 617 F.2d 571 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 893 (1978); United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); United
States v. Romanov, 509 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1975).
21.R.C. §7206(1) (1984).
I1d
'United States v. Greenburg, 735 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1984).
51d.
Id. at 31.
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Anyone who knowingly makes false statements on a tax return will be
subject to prosecution under Section 7206(1) even if the false statements do not
result in an underpayment of tax.
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"'Tradeor Business"
Ditunno v. Commissioner
TERRY VINCENT

Although the term "trade or business" appears in over 200 sections of the
Internal Revenue Code, there is no authoritative or codified definition of the
term.' The reason may be that although the term "trade or business" is deceptively simple, it remains impossible to establish an all-inclusive definition of the
phrase as it is used throughout the Code.
In Ditunno v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court faced the issue of whether
the taxpayer was engaged in a "trade or business" within the meaning of I.R.C.
Section 162. Anthony Ditunno was a full-time gambler who did not receive income from any other source, 3 and who bet entirely on his own accord., He did
not sell betting tips, collect commissions for placing bets, or work as a
bookmaker.' Mr. Ditunno's activity was confined to betting his own money.'
Ditunno deducted his gambling losses as business expenses to arrive at his adjusted gross income in accordance with I.R.C. Section 62(l).1
To determine whether Ditunno properly concluded his gambling activity
constituted a "trade or business," the Tax Court looked to past judicial interpretations of the term. The evolution of the judicial interpretation of the term
8
"trade or business" is most often traced to Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. The
Supreme Court, interpreting the meaning of "trade or business" within the
Corporation Tax Act of 19099 said, "'[b]usiness' is a very comprehensive term
and embraces everything about which a person can be employed. [A business
is] that which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of
livelihood or profit . .. '"
In 1940, Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed a somewhat narrower view in
his concurring opinion in Deputy v. duPont" when he stated: ".... carrying on
'Some sections provide definitions for the term as it applies specifically to that section within the Internal
Revenue Code. See generally, I.R.C. §§335, 502, and 7701. (1983).
dissenting).
180 T.C. 362 (1983) (Tannenwald, J.,
'Id. at 364.
'Id.

'Id.
6Id.

'I.R.C. §62(1) (1983) defines an individual's adjusted gross income as gross income minus deductions "which

consist of
are attributable to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does not

the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee." Id.
'220 U.S. 107 (1911).
'Tarriff Act of 1909, Pub.L. No. 61-5, 36 Stat. 11.
10220 U.S. 107 (1910).
'1308 U.S. 488 (1940).
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any trade or business; within the contemplation of Section 23(a)"2, involves
holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services.' 3
One year later in Higgins v. Commissioner" the Supreme Court again had
before it the issue of the meaning of "trade or business" as used in I.R.C. Section 23(a). Even though the facts in Higgins were similar to those in duPont5
and the lower court in Higgins had relied in part on Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in duPont,6 the Supreme Court did not adopt that test.'7 Instead the Court stated "[tlo determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are
'carrying on a business' requires an examination of the facts in each case.""
Shortly after the Higgins decision, Congress responded by enacting Section 212 of the Code 9 which allows an individual2 ° to deduct "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year

. .

for the

management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income."'" Thus Section 212 allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses from
the gross income of an income-producing activity, even though that activity
itself does not qualify as a trade or business.
The Ditunno court looked to the Higgins test and, after reviewing the
facts22 and circumstances, the court held that Ditunno was in the trade or
business of gambling within the meaning of Section 62(l).23 This judicial interpretation of what constituted a trade or business, as well as the result in Ditunno, were not followed by a unanimous court. In his dissenting opinion, Chief
"I.R.C. §23(a) (1939) is the predecessor of I.R.C. §162 (1983).

13308 U.S. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1-312 U.S. 212 (1941).
"Both Higgins and duPont dealt with investors who deducted expenses relating to the management of their
own securities portfolios.
"I I F.2d at 797.
"Because the facts in duPont and Higgins were so similar and the fact that duPont was decided only one
year before Higgins, Higgins provided a convenient time for the Supreme Court to adopt Justice

Frankfurter's test.
11312 U.S. at 217.
"9Sec. 121, 56 Stat. 798 (1942). The existing law allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in connection

with a trade or business. Due partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly to court decisions, nontrade
or nonbusiness expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nonbusiness income is fully subject to tax.
The bill corrects this inequality. Thus, whether or not the expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade
or business, if it is expended in the pursuit of income or in connection with property held for the production
of income, it is allowable. H. R. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 372, 410.
""The Section 152-Section 212 dichotomy that exists with respect to individual taxpayers has no applicabili-

ty to corporate taxpayers; accordingly, expenses incurred by a corporation in managing its passive investments are considered to be deductible under Section 162" Roth, Trade or Business Requirement of Sec.
162 and the Deductibility of Preoccupancy Expenses Incurredin Rental Real Estate Projects, 57 TAXES

33, 39 (1979).
11I.R.C. §212(2) (1983).
"The court noted that Ditunno gambled on a daily basis, devoted his full time to gambling activities, and, in
placing bets, was not assured a return. 80 T.C. at 372.
23]d.
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Judge Tannenwald felt the majority ignored both the nature of the Higgins
test and a long-accumulated body of case law. 2 Judge Tannenwald stated that
holding one's self out to others as being engaged in the selling of goods or services was an essential ingredient to the interpretation of the term "trade or
business'. 5 By dismissing this ingredient, Judge Tannenwald stated the majori'
ty's opinion would "wreak havoc on the concept of trade or business. "26
Although the Tax Court in Ditunno preferred a broad interpretation of
the term "trade or business," its decision has yet to be expressly followed by
other courts. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to follow the
Ditunno reasoning in reversing Gajewski v. Commissioner27 . In reviewing its
past decisions, the Second Circuit Court identified a number of requirements
the taxpayer must satisfy to be engaged in a trade or business. The court stated
that a taxpayer must: 1) be regularly and actively involved in the activity; 2)
undertake the activity with the expectation of profit; and 3)hold himself out to
others as being engaged in the selling of goods or services." The court held firm
to the holding one's self out requirement, stating: "[sluch a requirement, in addition to describing the most common characteristics of the trader or
29
businessman, is administratively workable and fair to the taxpayers."
To date all courts interpreting the term "trade or business" have held that
the holding one's self out to others requirement to be valid with the exception
of the Tax Court. The extensive use of the term throughout the Code accentuates the need for uniformity among the courts when interpreting the term.
The undesirability of these varying interpretations of the same term within a
single section of the Code by different courts is too obvious for comment.

"Id. at 373.
2Id.

"Id. at 372.
r52 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 83,133 (1983) rev'd 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983).
n723 F.2d at 1065.
"Id. at 1067.
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The Doctrine of Election
Grynberg v. Commissioner
CHERLYN PHERIGO

In Grynberg v. Commissioner' the Tax Court held, once again, that the
doctrine of election prohibits a taxpayer from revoking an election made on his
timely-filed return.2 The chief argument by the taxpayer-petitioner in this case,
that their election was based on a mistake of fact and was therefore revocable
on an amended return, was rejected by the court. In the court's opinion, the
doctrine of election is not an "outmoded, equitable doctrine," but a viable,
healthy one which precludes petitioner's claim.3 The court did not take this opportunity to abandon the applicability of this traditional and well-established
device of federal tax law, but chose instead to affirm its effect in such situations.
The doctrine of election has been consistently held to consist of: 1) an
available, free choice between two or more alternatives and 2) an overt act by
the taxpayer communicating the choice to the Commissioner 4 . It has been applied in a wide variety of contexts within the tax realm.
In Grynberg,the taxpayer and his wife made an affirmative Code Section
1705 election to have their charitable contribution deduction calculated according to Section 170(b)(l)(D)(iii). 6 Pursuant to such provision, the fair market
value (FMV) of donated property is reduced by fifty percent of the amount
which would have been long term capital gain if the property had been sold at
FMV, subject to a limit of fifty percent of adjusted gross income. Any remainder is carried over to subsequent years. This election was properly made.7
An IRS audit resulted in an increase in the taxpayer's gross income, thereby increasing the deductible amount for charitable contributions in the first year,
and decreasing the contribution carryover to the second year. In response, the
taxpayers requested that their election be revoked and that their deduction be
recalculated under Code Section 170(b)(1)(C)(i), where the FMV of the donated
property, up to thirty percent of gross income, is deductible. The court rejected
petitioner's contention that the mistake of fact exception to the doctrine of
election allows revocation. It found the tax effect of the audit on the charitable
contributions deductions to be based upon items that were unrelated to that
'83 T.C. 255 (1984).
'The Grynberg court also reached a decision on an issue involving the prepayment of delay rentals which is
not discussed in this article.
'83 T.C. at 260-61.
'10 MERTENS, J., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 60.19, at 73 (1976).
'All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
6Now Code §170(b)(1)(C)(iii).
'The election was made pursuant to the requirements of Treas. Reg. §l. 170A-8(d)(2)(c).
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deduction, and the "unexpected tax consequences" were not a mistake of fact.'
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that a material mistake
of fact has, in the past "vitiate[d] the binding nature of an election,"9 citing Roy
H. Park Broadcasting, Inc. v. Commissioner,0 and Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner." In Park, the mistake of fact was found to involve an unanticipated
change in FCC policy which allowed the petitioner to obtain control of a radio
station that he reasonably believed would not be obtained. This resulted in a
change in Code Section 1071 elective treatment of its sale of shares as an involuntary conversion 2 . In Meyer, the taxpayers relied in good faith upon an understated corporate earned surplus figure in making a Code Section 112(b)(7)
election to treat the amount as ordinary income. The Fifth Circuit allowed the
taxpayer to amend the return seeking capital gain treatment instead. 3
The Grynberg court found neither of these exception cases applicable, but
rather found convincing the general rule that, "[oince the taxpayer makes an
elective choice, he is stuck with it."" Furthermore the court stated: "[w]here
unexpected tax consequences arise solely due to unrelated audit adjustments,
no material mistake of fact has occurred."' 5 The change in Grynberg's gross income figure was not found to constitute a mistake of fact. In deciding what effect the audit change had, the court apparently relied upon the statement in
Estate of Stamos v. Commissioner6 , that mere "[olversight, poor judgement,
ignorance of the law, misunderstanding of the law, unawareness of the tax
consequences of making an election, miscalculation, and unexpected subsequent events have all been held insufficient to mitigate the binding effect of
elections made under a variety of provisions of the Code."' 7
The court felt compelled by this precedent and also by the treatment by
the Tenth Circuit (where the Grynberg case would be appealed) of elections
and not subject to any of its exceptions. The events here could be described
within the above quotation as either a "misunderstanding of the law" as it
related to the taxation of their unrelated items, or as an "unexpected subsequent event" namely, the audit adjustment of their gross income.

'83 T.C. at 263.
'83 T.C. at 261-62.
1078 T.C. 1093 (1982).
"200 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1952).
1278 T.C. 1093 (1982).
13200 F.2d at 597.
"83 T.C. at 261 citing Roy H. Park Broadcasting, Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 1093, 1134 (1982).
"583 T.C. at 263. See Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963); Estate of Stamos v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 468 (1970).
155 T.C. 468 (1970).
1183 T.C. at 262, quoting Stamos, 55 T.C. at 474.
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Petitioners also argued that the legislative history of the charitable deduction provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 supported their claim, and that
the language of Regulation Section 1.170A-8(d)(2) does not necessarily mean
the election on the original return.18 Both arguments were summarily dismissed
by the court.
The court concluded that the doctrine of election applied to the Grynberg
case, and announced its decision without reservation, qualification, extension
a misor further restriction. It held that a mistake as to tax consequences is not
9
take of fact, and that revocation of the election will not be permitted.' The fact
that a taxpayer's decision later turned out to have been unwise does not mean
that no real decision has been made. The taxpayer is stuck with his decision.
The reason for the doctrine's prohibition of revocation after the period for
filing is that a revocation on an amended return would impose "burdensome
0
uncertainties upon the administration of revenue laws."" In this case it appears clear that administrative certainty is more than mere convenience. Every
audit culminating in a change of an item on the taxpayer's return would result
in an amended return seeking an alternative election if it had more favorable
tax consequences. Realizing that this occurs frequently, especially with the
Code Section 170 charitable deduction election, some inequity to the directlyaffected taxpayer must be sacrificed in such situations to the interests of the
collection system and the taxpayers indirectly affected thereby.

ln light of its disposition of the case under the doctine of election, the court did not address this second
argument.
183 T.C. at 263.
1304 U.S. at 194.
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Partial Termination of a Section 401 Plan
Tipton and Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner
DAVID DEVANY

In Tipton and Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court considered whether a partial termination of a Section 401(a) plan occurred when
employee-plan participants were discharged solely due to adverse economic
conditions. In Tipton and Kalmbach, a consulting engineering corporation
discharged 34 percent and 51 percent of its profit sharing plan participants during 1971 and 1972 respectively. These reductions were attributed to a decrease
in volume of the taxpayer's business rather than any liquidation of the taxpayer.2 Since the discharged employees had no non-forfeitable rights to
benefits, the continued qualification of the taxpayer's plan under Section
401(a) hinged upon whether the reductions constituted a partial termination.
The taxpayer argued that since the reduction in plan participation was
due to adverse economic conditions which were beyond its control, no partial
termination had occurred. 3 It emphasized that there was no intention to
deprive plan participants of their benefits. The IRS contended that adverse
economic conditions would not excuse what was otherwise a partial termination.4 The court, in holding that there was a partial termination,5 did not look
to the intention of the employer but simply to the fact that there was a reduction in plan participation. According to the court, Congress, in enacting I.R.C.
Section 401 (a)(7), sought to protect employees from forfeiting their retirement
benefits, regardless of the employer's intent.6 As such, if the taxpayer's position
were to be accepted, there would be significant forfeiture of accrued, but
vested, benefits. The court found this result to be clearly outside of the
legislative intent of Section 401(a)(7). 7
The taxpayer further asserted that a holding that there was a partial termination would: (1) make it impossible for companies operating in industries
subject to workforce fluctuations to maintain qualified plans, and (2) lead to
discrimination against long term employees because laid off short term
employees would be automatically vested, whereas long term employees would
not be fully vested before the time established in the vesting schedule The
1

83 T.C. 154 (1984).
'Id.at 155.
3
1d at 159.
'Id.
'Id. at 160.
'Id. at 161.
'Id.
'Id.
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court rejected the first argument, since a plan would qualify under Section
401(a) by simply granting terminated employees non-forfeitable rights to
benefits." Partial termination would merely require that the accrued benefits of
terminated employees be treated as vested rights, rather than forfeitures subject to reallocation to remaining participants. The court likewise rejected the
second argument because it was based on the incorrect assumption that the
discharges were temporary, rather than permanent in nature."
In conclusion, the rule set forth by the court is that the employer's intent
is irrelevant in determining whether a partial termination has occurred. If
there is a significant reduction in the number of plan participants, a partial termination has occurred. If those discharged employees have no non-forfeitable
rights to benefits, the plan does not qualify under Section 401(a).

'Id. at 162.
that short
"Id. The court indicated that this argument would only have merit where the factors demonstrate
alongside
worked
and
vested,
fully
benefits
accrued
with
work
to
returned
rehired,
term employees were
did not support these
long term employees who may not have been fully vested. The facts in the present case
assumptions. Id.
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Life Insurance Changes Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984
CLIFFORD

L.

DECAMP

Generally, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 made several changes in the area
of life insurance taxation. Probably the most important change was the addition of I.R.C. Section 7702, defining life insurance for tax purposes. In order to
be classified as life insurance and thus receive favorable tax treatment, a policy
must meet the state requirements for life insurance and one of the two alternative tests. The first of these alternative tests is the cash value accumulation
test.' The second is a combination of the guideline premium2 and cash value
corridor test.'
Under the cash accumulation test, the cash surrender value of the life insurance contract cannot at any time exceed the net single premium that would
be necessary to fund future benefits at the same level. "Cash surrender value"
means the amount the policyholder is entitled to receive if he cashed in the
policy or the amount the policyholder can borrow against. The purpose behind
this component is to exclude those contracts with interest orientation from
favorable life insurance treatment. The "net single premium" is computed by
using the greater of the annual effective rate of four percent or the rate
guaranteed on the issuance of the life insurance contract.4 The "future
benefits" are the death and endowment benefits. The total of any qualified additional benefits are hot to be taken into account in determining the net single
premium. However, the charge stated in the insurance contract for the
qualified additional beenfit is treated as a future benefit and increases the
amount of the net single premium. The term "qualified additional benefits" includes, guaranteed insurability, accidental death or disability benefits, family
term coverage and disability benefits,5 and other benefits as prescribed by
Treasury Regulation.'
The second test has two components: the guideline premium and the cash
value corridor test. The guideline premium component distinguishes between
contracts where there is a traditional level of investment and those involving
higher levels of investment. The policy meets these requirements if the sum of
premiums paid does not exceed the greater of the guideline single premium or
the sum of the guideline single premiums to date of determination.7 The
'I.R.C. §7702(b).
2

1.R.C. §7702(c).
31.R.C. §7702(d).
4
1.R.C. §7702(b)(2)(A).
'I.R.C. §7702(0(5).
'I.R.C. §7702(0(5)(v).
'I.R.C. §7702(c)(I).
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guideline single premium is the premium required to fund the future benefits
under the insurance contract.8 The guideline level premium is the level annual
amount, payable over a period ending when the insured reaches age 95, that is
necessary to fund future benefits under the insurance contract.9
The cash value corridor test disqualifies life insurance contracts that permit excessive cash value to build up. A life insurance contract fails this test if
the death benefits at any time are equal to or greater than the applicable percentage of cash surrender value in the statutory table in I.R.C. Section
7702(d)(2).
If neither test is met, the contract will not qualify for life insurance treatment each year. The taxable income from the policy is equal to the increase in
the contract's net surrender value, plus the cost of the life insurance provided,
minus the premiums paid and the policyholder dividends received."
This new definition of life insurance applies to life insurance contracts
issued after December 31, 1984, unless one of three exceptions are met." Also,
if a life insurance contract issued after June 30, 1984 provides for increasing
death benefits and has premium funding more rapid than ten year level
premium payments, it will not qualify under the definition of life insurance. 2
The first exception is if the life insurance contract is a flexible premium
contract which provides for the payment of premiums which are not fixed by
the insurance company as to time and amount."3 The second exception is for
contracts which would meet the definition of a life insurance contract under
Section 7702's cash value accumulation if a three instead of four percent interest rate were assumed and if the date of maturity were assumed to be twenty
years from the date of issue or the day which the insured reaches age 95,
whichever is earlier.'4 The third exception is for insurance contracts whose
premiums are adjusted, reflecting the level amount necessary to provide a level
death benefit assuming a three percent annual interest rate. 5
Life insurance contracts which are issued in exchange for contracts existing before January 1, 1985 will be considered as new contracts issued after
December 31, 1984.16 A change in an existing contract is not considered an exchange of an existing contract if the amount of death benefits, the pattern of
.R.C. §7702(c)(3).
9

I.R.C. §7702(c)(4).
11I.R.C. §7702(g)(B).
"Deficit Reduction Act
2
Deficit Reduction Act
"Deficit Reduction Act
"Deficit Reduction Act
"Deficit Reduction Act

of 1984,.Pub. L. No.
of 1984, Pub. L. No.
of 1984, Pub. L. No.
of 1984, Pub. L. No.
of 1984, Pub. L. No.

98-369, §221(d), 98 Stat. 772.
98-369, §221(d)(2)(A), 98 Stat. 772.
98-369, §221 (d)(2)(B)(i), 98 Stat. 772.
98-369, §221(d)(2)(B)(ii), 98 Stat. 772.
98-369, §221(d)(2)(B)(iii), 98 Stat. 772.

"I.R.C. §7702(f)(7)(B).
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these benefits, the pattern of premiums, and the rates guaranteed remain unchanged. Therefore, if minor changes are made in a life insurance contract
which do not affect these, it will not be classified as a new insurance contract
subject to the new rules.
Another area of change in the law affecting life insurance concerns group
term life insurance. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended I.R.C. Section 79
which requires tax to be paid by former employees on the cost of their insurance coverage over $50,000. Additionally, the Tax Reform Act attempted
to cut down on the number of discriminatory group term life insurance plans
by making the full amount of the cost of the life insurance which was paid by
the employer, taxable to the employees. Also, the cost attributable to the employee cannot be determined under the uniform cost table, but rather it is includible on the basis of actual cost. Both of these provisions were added by
Congress in order to equalize the treatment of all employees, both active and
retired. These amendments are effective for years after December 31, 1983,
but do not apply to plans which exist as of January 1, 1984 which have an individual who retires under that plan if that individual is 55 years old on or before January 1, 1984 and was employed at anytime during 1983, or retired
from employment on or before January 1, 1984. Existing plans must conform
by January 1, 1987, excluding coverage provided to employees retiring before
January 1, 1987.1"

"Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §223(d), 98 Stat. 775, 776.
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S Corporation Changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1984
CLIFFORD

L.

DECAMP

There were many changes to the S corporation tax laws due the Tax
Reform Act of 1984. Among these changes are three that were made to the accumulated adjustments account of S corporations. The accumulated adjustments account is an account of an S corporation used to compute the tax
effect of distributions by the corporation when it has accumulated earnings
and profits. The first change is that an S corporation's losses in a tax year may
cause the accumulated adjustments account to be negative, creating a situation where the accumulated adjustments account will become zero or become
positive only after the negative account balance has been replaced by income.'
The second change was that nondeductible amounts which are not related to
the production of income will be taken into account to reduce an S corporation's accumulated adjustments account.2 The third change is the creation of a
rule to apply where the S corporation has earnings and profits and the distributions exceed the balance in the accumulated adjustments account. The rule is
that, except to the extent provided by regulations, the balance of the account
will be allocated among the distributions in proportion to their size. This has
the effect of requiring proration of the amount of each distribution during the
year to determine how much is a dividend.' All three of these changes to the
accumulated adjustments account apply to tax years after 1982.
Another major change made to S corporation taxation, was to allow an
election not to reduce the basis of its stock for all distributions during the posttermination transition period.4 This election allows the S corporation the opportunity to treat these distributions as dividends. This would most likely be
done in order to avoid the accumulated earnings or personal holding company
taxes. This can only be done if all the shareholders agree, and only applies to
those corporations who have accumulated earning and profits.' Normally in a
post-termination transition period, the distributions of money are nontaxable
distributions which reduce the adjusted basis of the corporation stock to the
extent of the accumulated adjustments account. If the election not to reduce
the basis of stock is made, that distribution will be treated as a dividend to
shareholders. 6
Under past rules, when an S corporation becomes a C corporation during
1I.R.C. §1368(e)(1)(A).
2
1d.
'I.R.C. §1368(c).
4
.R.C. §1371 (e)(2).
1d.
q.R.C. §1371(a).
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it's tax year, the tax year is divided into two short tax years with income and
expenses allocated between the two. Now the corporation need not close its
books on the termination date. All items of income, loss, deductions and credit
can be allocated across the entire year, based on the number of days in each
short tax year. An S corporation can still assign items of S and C corporation
years by closing the books on termination of the S election, but only if all
shareholders of both the S corporation and C corporation agree.'
In order to apply I.R.C. Section 338 in a consistent manner to S corporations who sell their stock to a C corporation, and to C corporations who sell
their stock to another C corporation, Section 1362(e) was amended to allow the
purchasing corporation to elect treatment of the acquisition of the stock of the
target corporation as if it were the purchase of the target corporation's assets.,
This is done to avoid having to recapture items which flow through to the
shareholder's individual returns and instead have them be reported by the purchasing corporation.
The 1984 Act also provides that if a debt owed by an S corporation to one
of its shareholders becomes worthless, the losses that pass through to the
shareholder are used first to reduce the shareholder's basis in the debt. This
allows a shareholder to claim a deduction for losses based on this debt in the
year that the corporation files bankruptcy.'
There were two amendments to other sections of the Code. The first of
these was to amend Section 465(a)(1) to apply the at-risk rules to losses at the
shareholder level rather than at the corporate level, thus treating the S corporation similar to partnerships. Also Section 267(f), which modified the
general rule that an S corporation cannot deduct business expenses and interest owed to related parties, has been amended to permit a deduction for an
item after it is paid and includible, if the item is deductible at some later time.
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 created a temporary rule permitting S corporation shareholders to treat income of the corporation as if received by the
shareholder as investment income. This can be done for income which would
be passed through to the shareholder by reason of their shareholder holdings,
except to income attributable to personal services performed by a shareholder.
This is designed to lessen the impact of the transition from the provisions of
Subchapter S to the new provisions of S corporations. 0
Section 1363(e) was added to the Internal Revenue Code in order to
clarify situations where gain is not recognized by an S corporation on the
distribution of appreciated property in complete liquidation when the distribu'I.R.C. §1362(e)(3).
'I.R.C. §1362(e)(6)(C).
9I.R.C. §1367(b)(3).
"0Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 966.
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tion is done in respect to its stock."
Earnings and profits of S corporations are adjusted for taxes where the
corporation is liable for the investment tax credit recapture. This applies to S
corporations whose accumulated earnings and profits are reduced by the
recapture of investment tax credit. This new rule is effective for years after
December 31, 1982.12
The Tax Reform Act also made several changes to the requirements for S
corporation status. S corporations are not treated as members of an affiliated
group during a period, by reason of the ownership of stock of another corporation, if that corporation has not begun business and if the corporation does not
have gross income. It eliminates the taxable income test to determine whether
a subsidiary is inactive and replaces it with the gross income test. Thus, it
prevents the inadvertent termination of the S corporation's S election which
would go back to the beginning of the year in which the acquisition occurs, by
reason of the subsidiary having taxable income. 3 Additionally, under I.R.C.
Section 1363(b)(4), added to the Code, the corporate preference rules of I.R.C.
Section 291 apply to S corporations as well as C corporations for any three
years preceding that year.

"I.R.C. §1363(e).
' 21.R.C. §1371(d)(3).
"I.R.C. §1361(c).
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PartnershipChanges in the 1984 Act
MARK GIANCARLI

The partnership utilizes the pass-through method of taxation and has
been used as a tax shelter. The 1984 Tax Reform Act' (Act) addresses itself to
some of the abusive tactics in the partnership area, which are as follows:
(1) After March 31, 1984, for property contributed to a partnership by a
partner, income, gain, loss and deductions must be shared among partners pursuant to IRS regulations to take into account the variation between the partnership's adjusted basis in the property and its fair market value at the time it
was contributed.2
(2) As a rule, a partner's share of distributive share items is to be determined by taking into account his varying interests in the partnership during
the tax year in order to prevent the retroactive allocation of deductible expenses to partners entering a partnership late in the year. The Act specifically
provides that the determination of the distributive share be made using a
method prescribed in the regulations.'
(3) The Act changes the treatment of payments to partners for services
performed for, or property transferred to a partnership. These changes are designed to eliminate disguised payments for services or property and disguised
sales.!
(4) In order to prevent the conversion of capital losses into ordinary losses
or the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains by contributing property to a partnership and even contributions of unrealized receivables, inventory
items, and capital loss property, the Act provides rules that require the partnership to recognize income or loss on any disposition of certain contributed property based on the character of the assets in the hands of the contributing part5
ner.

(5)After March 31, 1984, if a corporation distributes an interest in a partnership, the amount and character of the gain recognized by the corporation
will be computed by treating the distribution as if it included a property
distribution consisting of the corporation's proportionate share of such partnership property.'

'Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369.
'Act Section 71, amending Code Sections 613A(c)(7)(D), 704(c), and 743(b).
'Act Section 72, amending Code Section 706.
'Act Section 73, amending Code Section 707(a).
'Act Section 74, adding Code Section 724 and amending Code Section 735.
6
Act Section 75, adding Code Section 386, and amending Code 761 and 7701.
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(6) After March 31, 1984, for distributions, sales, and exchanges, a partnership that owns an interest in another partnership will be treated as owning
its proportionate share of the property of the other partnership for purposes of
determining whether the property of the first partnership is an unrealized
receivable or an inventory item under Code Section 751.1
(7) After March 31, 1984, the nonrecognition of gain or loss rules for likekind exchanges will not apply to exchanges of partnership interests. The Act
imposes a special 180-day time limit on the completion of like-kind exchanges
and requires the property to be received in the exchange to be identified within
45 days after the date of the original property transfer.'
(8) After March 31, 1984, a partnership is prohibited from increasing the
adjusted basis of remaining partnership property under Code Section
734(b)(1)(B) following a distribution of partnership property which is an interest in another partnership if the second partnership has not also made the
Code Section 754 election to adjust the basis of partnership assets upon
distribution of property and upon the transfer of a partnership interest. In
other words, to receive a step-up in basis of partnership assets, related partnerships must make consistent Code Section 754 elections.'
(9) The Raphan case" holds that a general partner who guaranteed an
otherwise nonrecourse debt of the partnership was not to be treated as personally liable with respect to that debt and that the limited partners were entitled to include a portion of the nonrecourse debt in computing the basis of
their partnership interests. However, the new regulations are expected to
follow the position in Rev. Rul. 83-151" that only the general partner's basis is
increased to the extent of the nonrecourse liability.

'Act Section 76, adding Code Section 751(0.
sAct Section 77, amending Code Section 1031(a).
'Act Section 78, amending Code Section 734(b).
10Raphan v. United States, CIs. Ct., 83-2 USTC 1 9613, 3 Cis. Ct. 457 (1983).

"1983-2 C.B. 105.
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IRAs, SEP and KEOGHs
JOHN LUCAS

Like other aspects of the Code, provisions effecting Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA's), Simplified Employee Pension Plans (SEP's), and Keoghs
were changed by the 1984 Tax Reform Act. Although these changes may seem
rather minor, it is very important that tax return preparers be aware of them.
Prior to 1985 the due date for contributions to IRA's could be extended
by the extension of the individual's tax return. However, contributions after
1984 must be made by the unextended due date of the tax return.'
Beginning in 1985 alimony is treated as compensation for purposes of
calculating the IRA deduction limit. This provision eliminates the restriction
on divorced individuals who had previously contributed to an IRA under the
spousal IRA rules.'
Another change effecting IRA rules deals with plan trustees and requires
that IRA contributions be reported to the IRS and state to which taxable year
a particular contribution relates. Failure to file such report will cause a penalty
to the trustee which increases from $10 to $50 for a second offense.'
Under the Act, an amount is not required to be distributed under the
usual rules for IRA's or qualified plans to the extent that amounts are held by
an insurer that, on March 15, 1984, is engaged in a rehabilitation proceeding
under applicable state insurance laws.4
The Act also repealed the estate tax exclusion for qualified plans and IRA
benefits, in non-community property states. Generally, however individuals
who have received benefits prior to 1985 and who irrevocably designate the
form of their benefits before the enactment may qualify for the $100,000 exclusion, just as those who met those requirements before 1983 qualified for the
unlimited estate tax exclusion which existed prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).1
Limits on employee deduction for employer contribution made to SEPs
are increased to match the $20,000 limit on annual addition to qualified defined contribution plans. This increased employee deduction is effective for tax
years beginning after 1983.6 If the employer does not maintain an integrated
'Act §147(c), amending I.R.C. §219(f)(3)(A); Act §147(d).
'Act §529, deleting I.R.C. §219(b)(4) and amending I.R.C. §219(f)(1).
'Act. § 147(a), (b), and (d) amending 1.R.C. §408(i) and §6693(a).
'Defecit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 966 §553.
'Amending I.R.C. §§2039(e), 2039(g).
'Act. Sec. 713(d)(2), amending I.R.C. §219(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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plan during the taxable year, OASDI contributions may be taken into account
as contributions by the employer to the employee's SEP, if OASDI contributions are taken into account with respect to each employee maintaining an
SEP. The rules for OASDI contributions to SEP apply contributions to SEP's
made on behalf of a self-employed individual.7
The Tax Reform Act of 1984, following the lead set by TEFRA, repealed
a number of special deductions for contributions to a Keogh, which are as
follows:
(1)The rule relating to the return of excess contributions made on behalf
of an owner-employee before the due date of the annual income tax return;
(2)The special exception to the excess contribution rules for contributions
by an employer on behalf of an owner-employee to pay premiums for an annuity, endowment of life insurance contract on the life of the owner-employee
issued under a Keogh plan;
(3)The requirement that limitations on deductions for a defined contribution plan must be computed separately with respect to (a) contributions on
behalf of owner-employees and nonowner-employee partners, and (b) contributions on behalf of the common-law employees;
(4) The requirement that the special deduction limitations for selfemployed individuals and S corporation shareholder-employees be reduced by
any SEP employer contributions made on their behalf; and
(5)The rule that contributions on behalf of an owner-employee for levelpremium insurance contracts can exceed 25 percent of compensation limit on
contributions to a defined contribution plan.
Section 404(a)(8)(D) was changed to clarify that compensation in the case
of a self-employed individual is a reference to earned income of such individual, without regard to the deduction allowable for a contribution to a
qualified plan, which is derived from the trade or business under which a plan
is established. The TEFRA earned income definition from Section 401(c)(2)(r)
is unchanged, and is computed taking into account amounts contributed by
the employer to a Keogh plan to the extent a deduction is allowed for the contribution. These changes are effective for tax years beginning after 1983.8

'Act. §713(j), amending I.R.C. §408(k)(3)(D).
'Act §713(d), amending I.R.C. §§404(a)(8)(D), 404(e), 415(c)(6)(C), and 415(e)(3)(B)(ii)(11), repealing I.R.C.
§§72(m)(9), 401(e), 404(a)(9), 404(h)(4), and 415(c)(7).
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Alimony and the Alimony Trust in 1985
JEANNE BITONTE

The Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA) effected a new definition of alimony.
I.R.C. Section 71 currently provides that payments will qualify as alimony if
they are:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

in cash;
made under a divorce or separation agreement;
not between members of the same household;
not to extend beyond the death of the payee spouse;
not between spouses who file a joint return; and
if in excess of $10,000 in any calendar year, extend for at least six
years. If either spouse dies or payee spouse remarries, then the payments may terminate before six years.'

TRA eliminates the rule that alimony payments had to continue for ten
years, regardless of the amount.
TRA did not change the income tax treatment of alimony. The payee
spouse continues to include the payment in his/her gross income and the payor
spouse may deduct the amount of the payment.' However, case law suggests
that the payor spouse may not deduct rehabilitation alimony, but the payee
spouse must include it in his/her gross income.
TRA added Sections 215(c) and 6676(c) to the Code. Section 215(c)(1) requires that any recipient of alimony must furnish the payor with the recipient's
taxpayer identification number (TIN). Section 215(c)(2) requires the payor to
include the recipient's TIN on the payor's federal tax return in the year the
payments are made. Section 6676 states that the Internal Revenue Service will
assess a $50 penalty against any party who fails to comply with Section
215(c)(10) and (2) unless the party can show reasonable cause for noncompliance.'
An alimony trust continues to be an available means to satisfy an alimony
obligation. Before TRA either Section 71 or 682 of the Code governed the
trust, depending on whether the trust was established before the divorce or incident to it. It appears that after TRA, Section 682 primarily governs the alimony trust because Section 71 does not contain the references to trust as it did
before TRA. Accordingly, as before TRA the payee spouse must include payment from the trust in his/her gross income. However, the payor probably will
1

I.R.C. §71 (1985) amending I.R.C. §71 (1984).
I.R.C. §215(a) (1985).
1I.R.C. §§215 and 6676.
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not be entitled to a deduction as he would if he/she had paid alimony outright.'
An important tax planning consideration is the potential for capital gains
and losses on property transferred to the trust. In United States v. DavisI the
Supreme Court held that it was a taxable event when one spouse transferred
property to another spouse pursuant to a divorce. The transferor was taxed on
the difference between his/her adjusted basis and the fair market value of the
property.6 TRA adds Section 1041 providing that no gain or loss will be
recognized on the transfer of property either 1)between spouses or 2) between
former spouses if related to the divorce. The transferee spouse takes the
transferor's adjusted basis and will recognize gain or loss upon the sale of the
property. The transferee tacks on the transferor's holding period to his/her own
and is taxed accordingly.7
When one party transfers property to another and it appears that the
transferee gave nothing of value to the transferor, gift tax is an important consideration. Before TRA, there were three ways that a transferee could avoid
gift tax: the support exception, the decree exception, and the two year exception.! After TRA if divorce occurs within three years, the transferor will pay
no gift tax on the transfer.9 Since there will eventually be a divorce decree and
consequently support rights relinquished, it appears that three pre-TRA exceptions have become one.
Estate tax consequences are another important tax planning consideration. Generally, a property transfer in release of support rights is an exchange
for adequate consideration and, therefore, is not included in the transferor's
gross estate. In Harris v. Commissioner,0 the Supreme Court added that there
was adequate consideration to avoid inclusion in the gross estate only if there
was a transfer pursuant to a divorce decree. To avoid gift tax, the parties must
have a decree within three years of a property transfer. Furthermore, after
TRA the focus is on Section 682 to determine the tax consequences of an
alimony trust. Before TRA, a Section 682 trust would not have been included
in the transferor's gross estate unless it fell within Section 2014." After TRA,
since Section 682 governs alimony trusts, the same rule may apply for 1985.
In addition, pre-TRA case law held that property settlement payments
'Seago and O'Neil, New Law Substantially Changes Treatment of Alimony and Property Transfers at
Divorce, 61 J. TAX'N 202, 205 (1984) [hereinafter cited Seago and O'Neill.

'370 U.S. 65 (1962).
'Seago and O'Neil supra note 4, at 202.
1.R.C. §1041 (1985).

'Sharfstein and Wallach, Tax Consequences of Divorce: Current Law/Proposed Changes, 123 Trust &
Estates, 23, 26-27 (April 1984).
91.R.C. §2516 (1985) amending §2516 (1984).
10340 U.S. 106 (1950).

"Estate of Statz v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 1172 (1982).
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after death were deductible for federal estate tax (FET) purposes only if made
pursuant to a court order. Payments made under a settlement agreement did
not satisfy the court order doctrine. TRA allows a FET deduction made pursuant to a property settlement because Code Section 2043(b) states that
divorce property settlements constitute adequate consideration for FET purposes. 3
The area of alimony and alimony trusts have changed drastically with
TRA. Commentators conclude that the law in this area needs clarification.
Until the law is clarified taxpayers should try to avoid possible undesirable tax
14
consequences by providing for them in a written agreement.

"Fink, Income, Gift, and Estate Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 119 Trusts & Estates, 54, 57-58 (March
1980).
13I.R.C. §2043 (1985).
"Seago and O'Neil, supra note 4, at 208.
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Tax Shelters Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984
JOHN LUCAS

Internal Revenue Service efforts to curb abusive tax shelters received a
boost from the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Prior to this Act there
were no requirements that tax shelters be registered. The Act requires
organizers to register any investment offerings expected to generate specific
levels of tax benefits and meet other investment criteria.'
Tax shelters are now required to be registered by filing Form 8264, Application for Registration of a Tax Shelter2 , with the Service not later than the
day on which the first offering for sale of any interest in the investment is
made.' Registration is required to include: (1) information identifying and
describing the tax shelter; (2) information describing the tax benefits of the
shelter; and (3) such other information as may be required by regulation4 .
Upon filing, the Service will assign a registration number to each tax
shelter. The seller or transferor is required to furnish the registration number
to all investors5 . This information is to be passed through a written statement.6
The investors are required to disclose this number on their returns when tax effects from the investment are recognized7 . Reporting by the investor is accomplished on Form 8271, Investor Reporting of Tax Shelter Registration
Number Noncompliance with any of these requirements can result in
penalties to the organizer, 9 the seller,"0 and the investor."
The individual or group primarily responsible for organizing the tax
shelter has primary responsibility for complying with the registration requirement 2 . Secondary responsibility falls on individuals participating in the
organization, management, and sale of the investment, in that order. 3
An investment will generally be required to be registered if it meets two
criteria. First, if it may be reasonably anticipated that the ratio of tax benefits
(deductions plus two hundred percent of the tax credits) potentially derived
.R.C. §6111.

'Temp. Reg. §301-611 I-It (question 47) (1984).
3

1.R.C.

§6111 (a)(1).

'I.R.C. §6111 (a)(2).
5I.R.C. §611 l(b).
6
Temp. Reg. §301-6111 -It (question 53) (1984).
7

1.R.C.

§611 I(b)(2).

8

Temp. Reg. §301-611 I-It (question 53) (1984).
1.R.C. §6707(a).
Iu.R.C. §6707(b)(1).
"I.R.C. §6707(b)(2).
"2Temp. Reg. §301-6111-It (question 26) (1984).
13/d.
9
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from the investment, to amounts invested by any investor (cumulative amount
of cash plus the adjusted basis of other property, less any liability to which the
property is subject) will be greater than two-for-one.' Second, the investment
must fall under any of the following categories: (1) it is required to be registered
under federal or state security laws; (2) it is sold under a federal or state
securities exemption which requires that notice be filed; or (3) it is a substantial
investment 5 , which means the aggregate amount that may be offered for sale
to all investors exceeds $250,000, and five or more investors are expected. 6
The Secretary has been empowered to make exemptions to the registration requirements. 7 Generally there are three such exemptions: (1) investment
in a principal place of residence by the purchaser; (2) sales or leases of tangible
personal property by the manufacturers to be used in the trade or business of
the purchaser; and (3) any other investment specified by the Secretary in a rulerelated notice published in the Federal Register. 8
Registration of a tax shelter is not an indication that the Service has
reviewed, examined, or approved the tax shelter or claimed tax benefits.' 9 Instead the Act provides a uniform method of assimilating information which
allows the Service to identify participants, and keep track of potentially
abusive transactions in tax shelters. Whereas previously the Service had to
search for this information, the Act requires taxpayers to accumulate this information and submit it to the Service.
When depreciation expense, interest deductions, and investment credits
are considered it becomes obvious that virtually any business investment that
is financed will meet the first criteria of being a tax shelter. Therefore prior to
offering an investment for sale, an organizer should know that if the investment meets any of the second criterion, and does not fall under an exemption,
the investment must be registered as a tax shelter.

'1.R.C. §6111 (c)(I)(A).
"I.R.C.
'1I.R.C.
111.R.C.
"Temp.

§611 I(c)(1)(B).
§611 1(c)(4).
§611 I(e)(3).
Reg. §301-6111 -It (question 24) (1984).
"rTemp. Reg. §301-6111 -It (question 3) (1984).
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Employee Stock Ownership Plans
DAVID DEVANY

The 1984 Tax Reform Act made several major changes concerning the
tax consequences of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The most important changes are: a tax-free rollover on the sale of "qualified securities" to
2
an ESOP,' the deduction for dividends paid on ESOP stock , and a partial ex3
clusion by the lender of interest earned on ESOP loans . These changes are
aimed at encouraging the implementation of ESOP's by making them more
beneficial to the corporation and the lending institution.
Under the Act, a seller, even if a key shareholder, may elect nonrecognition of gain from the sale of certain "qualified securities" if (1) the
securities are sold to an ESOP on an eligible farmer-owned cooperative,' and
(2) within a "qualified period," the seller acquires replacement securities of a
domestic corporation. In order for there to be non-recognition, the ESOP
must, after the sale, own at least 30 percent of the total value of the currently
outstanding employer securities. Qualified securities are those employer
securities issued by a domestic corporation which have been held by the seller
for at least one year, and which were not received by the seller as a distribution
from a qualified plan. The qualified period referred to above begins three months
before the date of the sale and ends twelve months after that date. The seller's
basis in the replacement securities is reduced by the amount of non-recognized
gain. It is important to note that this non-recognition provision requires the
seller to make an election no later than the seller's income tax return date.
A second major change made by the Act is that now an employer corporation is allowed a deduction for dividends paid on ESOP stock. The deduction is
allowed if the dividends are paid in cash directly to plan participants or are paid
to the plan and distributed in cash no later than 90 days after the close of the
plan's tax year. This is a major variance from the general rules of nondeductibility of dividends by the corporation. However, the benefits of this
new rule are partially offset by the fact that these dividends are not eligible for
the partial exclusion of dividends received by individuals.
Finally, under the Act, a bank or any commercial lender can now exclude
from its income 50 pecent of the interest received on loans to an ESOP or to a
corporation to be used for the benefit of an ESOP. The purpose of this provision is to encourage lending institutions to loan money to an ESOP. Lending
institutions have finite amounts of funds available and this provision makes it
.R.C. §1042.
1.R.C §§I 16(e), 404(k), and 3405(d)(l)(B)(iii).
I.R.C. §133.
4I.R.C.
§1381.
2
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cost beneficial to prefer an ESOP over other borrowers.
The Act also establishes an excise tax which can be imposed if within
three years after an ESOP acquired qualified securities in a non-recognition
transaction, the ESOP disposes of the securities and the total number of shares
held by the plan after the disposition is less than the total number of employer
securities held immediately after the sale on the plan and the ESOP owns less
than 30 percent of the value of the currently outstanding employer securities.
The excise tax will be ten percent of the amount realized on the disposition.
However, the tax will not be imposed if the disposition is made due to a participant's death, disability, separation from service or retirement.
The foregoing rules are evidence of congressional encouragement of
ESOP's and employer-owned corporations. These rules encourage a corporation to use an ESOP in order to get the dividend deduction and they encourage
a bank to loan money to an ESOP to utilize the interest exclusion. Furthermore, once an ESOP obtains ownership of a significant portion of employer
securities, the new rules attempt to protect this ownership interest by imposing
an excise tax on certain dispositions. From these new provisions, it is evident
that Congress favors ESOP's and intends to promote than in any way that it
can.
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C Reorganization Changes
A. DIMENGO
The Tax Reform Act of 1984' modified the statutory requirements for
qualification as a "C" reorganization. The general requirements under I.R.C.
Section 368 (a)(1)(C) have not been changed. A "C" reorganization still basically involves the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all of the assets
of another, transferor corporation in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring corporation.2 However, for transactions pursuant to plans adopted after July 18, 1984, the acquired corporation must distribute the stock or other property it receives in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. 3
The Secretary may waive the additional distribution requirement to transactions meeting any prescribed conditions." The Conference Committee Report states that waivers should be granted where the distribution would result
in substantial hardship.' However, the report also states that the waiver should
be granted only if the acquired corporation and its shareholders act as if the retained assets had been distributed and contributed to the capital of a new corSTEVEN

poration.6

Section 312 was also amended to allow the Secretary to prescribe regulations whereby the earnings and profits of the acquired corporation in a "C" or
"D" reorganization are to be allocated between the acquiring corporation and
the acquired corporation.7 The Conference Committee Report anticipates that
such allocations would enable there to be similar tax consequences for both an
"A" reorganization (e.g. a merger) preceded by a distribution, and a "C"
reorganization followed by a distribution
The Senate Committee Report notes that "C" reorganizations were originally designed to cover acquisitive transactions resembling statutory mergers
or consolidations whereby the acquired corporation is liquidated.9 However,
before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, transactions could qualify as "C"
reorganizations without a distribution of the acquired corporations assets. 10
'Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
I.R.C. §368(a)(l)(C).
3
I.R.C. §368(a)(2)(G)(i).
2

I.R.C. §368(a)(2)(G)(ii).
H.R. CONF.REP. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Tax MGMT(BNA)
B-284.
Id.
5

§312(h)(2).
'H.R. CONF REP. 4170 98th Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in The Tax Reform Act of 1984, TAX MGMT
(BNA) B-284.
'J.COMM. ON TAX'N 98th Cong., 2d sess. (1984) (Comm. Print 1984), reprinted in GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984. (P-H) 189.
7I.R.C.

1eid.
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Accordingly, the acquired corporation could remain active and defeat the
original intent of the "C" reorganization provision." Since tax attribution, such
as earnings and profits, carryover to the acquiring corporation, the acquired
corporation would have no tax attributes. 2 Sections 368 (a) and 312(h) were
3
amended to erase these opportunities for tax avoidance.'

"Id.
1Id.
"id
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Employee Leasing
WENDALL STOCKER

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, TEFRA, added
Section 414(n)' to the Internal Revenue Code. This new section became effective January 1, 1984 and involves employee leasing provisions as they relate to
qualified retirement plans. Generally, under Section 414(n), a person or entity
receiving services (herein referred to as the "recipient") from a leased individual must consider that individual as an employee for purposes of certain
employee benefit provisions. This occurs even though the individual is a common law employee of a leasing organization. In effect, the purpose of this new
section is to include these leased employees as actual employees when attempting to qualify a retirement plan. Prior to enactment of this section, an
organization could avoid including such employees in its qualified plans simply
by leasing their services.
In Notice 84-112, the Service advanced temporary rules which are
authoritative in making any subsequent rulings until permanent regulations
are issued. Under Code Section 414(n) and the rules of the Notice, an individual is deemed to be a "leased employee." The individual must, therefore,
be considered a common law employee of the recipient for purposes of certain
employee benefit provisions of the individual, although not an employee. In
addition, the individual must meet three additional criteria.
The first additional criterion requires that the services be "provided pursuant to an agreement between the recipient and any other person (the "leasing
organization").3 The Service does not make clear what constitutes the existence
of a leasing organization but simply states that this determination will be made
on a case by case basis.4 The agreement requirement is met if an oral contract
exists,' making a written agreement not necessary.
The second additional criterion requires that services be performed "on a
substantially full time basis for a period of at least one year."' 6 There are two
ways to meet this requirement. If, during any consecutive twelve month
period, a person provides, either at least 1500 hours of service to the recipient
or a number of hours of service which at least equals 75 percent of the average
number of hours normally performed by a recipient employee in the same position, the individual is deemed to have performed services on a substantially
'I.R.C. §414(n) (1982).
2
Notice 84-11, 1984-29 1.R.B. 31.
3
1.R.C. §414(n)(2)(A) (1982).
'Notice 84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31.
'Id.
'I.R.C. §414(n)(2)(B) (1982).
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full-time basis.' Any service hours provided to an organization which is related
to the recipient' are included in this computation. Furthermore, the one year
service period can be fulfilled prior to the January 1, 1984 effective date of Section 414(n), provided the services were performed on a substantially full time
basis during that previous period.'
The third additional criterion requires that services be of "a type
historically performed in the business field of the recipient by employees."'"
This requirement is considered met if it is not unusual for employees of
organizations in the same business field as the recipient to perform the services
provided by the leased individual." Only those individuals meeting all of the
above criteria are deemed "leased employees" and therefore, covered by the
Section 414(n) provisions.
Any individual deemed to be a "leased employee" of the recipient is considered a common law employee of the recipient for purposes of the following
employee benefit provisions 2 : the exclusive benefit rule, 3 minimum participation requirements," minimum vesting requirements, 5 anti-discrimination requirements, 6 limitations of contributions and benefits," simplified employee
pensions rule," top-heavy plans provisions, 9 and deductions for contributions.2" Although leased employees are considered employees of the recipient
for purposes of the above provisions, there is no provision requiring the inclusion of leased employees as participants in the recipients plan.2' Thus, provided
the leased employees are treated as the recipient's employees for purposes of
the above provisions and the plan otherwise qualifies under Section 401 (a), the
leased employees can be excluded from participation in the plan, either individually or as a class.22 However, recipients receiving services from leased
employees must amend their existing qualified plans to specifically provide
how the leased employees will be treated under the plans.23
'Notice 84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31.

.R.C. §414(n)(6) (1982) "Related persons" has the same meaning as used in Section 103(b)(6)(c).
'Notice
" .R.C.
"Notice
"I.R.C.
"I.R.C.
4
1

1.R.C.

84-1l, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31, 32.
§414(n)(2)(C) (1982).
84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31, 32.
§4 14(n) (3) (1982), Notice 84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31.
§401(a) (1982) Inclusion of this requirement is found in the Notice but not in the Code.
§401(a)(3) and 410 (1982).

"I.R.C. §§401(a)(7) and 411 (1982).
"I.R.C. §401(a)(4) (1982).
"I.R.C. §401(a)(6) and 415 (1982).
I.R.C. §408(k) (1982).
" .R.C. §416 (1982).
-I.R.C. §404 (1982) This requirement is mentioned in the Notice but not the Code.
"Notice 84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31, 32.
'id. at 33.

"Id.
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If a leased employee is included as a participant in a recipient's plan, the
entire period the individual has provided services to the recipient, including
periods prior to the January 1, 1984 effective date of Section 414(n), is taken
24
into account for purposes of the participation and vesting requirements.
However, the recipient is not required to include the individual as a participant
in its plan prior to January 1, 1984, even though, under the above rule, the participation and vesting requirements were fulfilled prior to that date. If included
as a participant in the recipient's plan, contributions or benefits provided by
the recipient on behalf of the leased employee, and based on compensation, are
determined according to the total compensation received from the leasing
25
organization attributable to the performance of services for the recipient.
Under Code Section 414(n)(5), the leased employees rules are not applicable to leased employees participating in a "safe harbor" plan maintained
by the leasing organization." A plan qualifies under this safe harbor exception
if it provides full and immediate vesting, immediate participation, and a
nonintegrated contribution pension plan." The leasing organization is not required to include all of its common law employees in the safe harbor plan provided the plan is an otherwise qualified plan, taking the excluded employees into account. 9 However, the general leasing provisions of Section 414(n) are
then applicable to those leased employees excluded from the safe harbor plan.

Id. at 32.
"Id. at 33.
I.R.C. §414(n)(5) (1982).
"Notice 84-1I, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31. Immediate participation need not occur prior to the January 1, 1984 effective date.
"I.R.C. §414(n)(5)(A) (1982).
'Notice 84-11, 1984-29 I.R.B. 31,33.
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Deductibility of Compensable Claims Under Section 165
CHERLYN PHERIGO

On May 2, 1984, the Sixth Circuit, in Miller v. Commissioner' affirmed
the Tax Court's holding that a taxpayer who voluntarily elects not to file an insurance claim for a casualty loss is not precluded from taking a casualty loss
deduction under Code Section 165.2 In so holding, the court expressly overruled its prior decision in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn3 to the extent that the
opinions conflict.
The situation in Miller involved a boating accident where a friend of the
taxpayer ran the taxpayer's boat aground, damaging the boat to the extent of
$842. The boat was insured, but the taxpayer chose not to pursue a claim for
fear that it would result in the cancellation of his insurance policies. 4 He collected $200 from the friend and thereafter claimed a $542 casualty loss deduction on his 1976 return.' The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, and the
taxpayer challenged that determination in the Tax Court. The Tax Court, in
view of Hills v. Commissioner,6 allowed the deduction.
The Sixth Circuit, not being able to distinguish its case at bar from Kentucky Utilities, where the taxpayer/insured failed to pursue indemnification
from its insurance carrier and was barred from taking any casualty loss deduction under the equivalent of Code Section 165 (a) except to the extent of its
deductible, required an overruling of Kentucky Utilities.
The Miller opinion7 initially interpreted the holding in Kentucky Utilities
to be: "either (a) that a taxpayer must exhaust all reasonable prospects for insurance indemnification before claiming a "sustained loss," or (b) that the
phrase "not compensated by" must be equated with the phrase "not covered
by" insurance."8
The first interpretation was rejected because the court found the language
of Code Section 165(a) required a separation of the loss from the insurance
consequences. Relying chiefly on Hills, the court decided that requiring ex'733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1984).
2
All references to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
3394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968).
'733 F.2d at 400. The evidence showed that the taxpayer had policies covering his car, boat, and
apartment
and had submitted a number of claims in the recent past. His broker had advised him that
another claim
would result in the cancellation of all the policies. Id. at n. 3.
5733 F.2d at 400. This takes into account the $100.00 limitation under Code Section 165 (c)(3).
676 T.C. 484 (1981), affd, 691 F.2d 997 (11th Cir. 1982). The case allowed a deduction
for a theft loss
covered by, but not claimed under, insurance.
'interestingly, the majority opinion was written by Judge Wellford, who commented that
substantially upon a proposed version by Judge Celebrezze, who was also on the panel it was "based
in Kentucky
Utilities." 733 F.2d at 400, n. 1.
'733 F.2d at 402 (footnote omitted).
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haustion of insurance indemnification "renders the 'not compensated by'
clause mere surplusage"9 because "any time a loss is sustained it, by definition,
would not be 'compensated for by insurance."' ' ° The majority believed the rule
of statutory construction requiring the avoidance of superfluous words was
controlling, and concluded that the taxpayer here sustained a loss during the
taxable year under Code Section 165(a).
The second interpretation was likewise rejected because the Miller panel
refused to hold that "not compensated by" means "not covered by" in interpreting Section 165.11 Again relying on Hills, the majority looked to legislative
history and the lack of support for the Kentucky Utilitiesopinion on this issue.
The court concluded that the language of the statute was clear and, without
resort to analogy, that the plain meaning must be adopted. The court noted
that Congress intended that Section 165 be applied to "'losses not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise' to avoid double compensation," and it further
expressed this intent in the regulations. The panel noted the observation in
Hills that "'It]he disposition the Commissioner favore[d] in this case would
'3
deny a Section 165 deduction any time a loss is covered by insurance."" The
ultimate holding was that Section 165(a) allows a casualty loss deduction when
1) there is a loss, and 2) it is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."'
The dissent was extended and strong, 5 advocating adherence to the Kentucky Utilities holding on this issue. The dissent's first reason was that the
"taxpayer's voluntary choice not to file an insurance claim.., prevented a loss
6
from being sustained under Section 165(a),"' because they found the concepts
of casualty and loss to be distinct. A casualty does not necessarily result in a
loss. The loss in Miller was caused by the taxpayer's failure to seek compensa7
tion, not by shipwreck, and thus was not deductible under the Code.'
The second reason for dissent was the belief that this transaction was not
closed and complete as required by Treasury Regulation Section 1.165-1 (b), be8
cause the taxpayer still had a valid claim against his insurer. The failure to exhaust reasonable prospects of recovery causes the loss to be not actually sustained.
'1d. at 400 (citing Hills, 691 F.2d at 1002).
'OId. citing 691 F.2d at 1001-1002.
"1d. at 403.
"11d. at 403-404. Specific regulations cited were Treas. Reg. §§1.165-1(c)(4) and 1.165-1(d)(2)(i). Id.
"Id. at 404 citing 691 F.2d at 1000.
"Id. at 404 (quoting Hills. 691 F.2d at 1000).
"The panel was divided 6-5 in Miller.

6733 F.2d at 405 (Contie, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
"Id. at 406.

at 407.
"Ild.
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Finally, the dissent was disturbed by the majority's position because it
results in preferred tax treatment for business taxpayers who will be able to
deduct "both their insurance premium costs and their unrecompensed casualty
damages for which reasonable prospects of recovery exist."' 9
The decision in Millershould come as no real surprise. In view of the Hills
decision in the Eleventh Circuit, it appears that more and more judges are convinced that the question of whether a loss is sustained should be resolved independently of any potential insurance consequences involved. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the House Ways and Means Committee
originally suggested that Section 165 read "losses ... not covered by insurance
or otherwise and compensated for," but the Senate Finance Committee
amended the section to say "losses ...

not compensated for by insurance or

otherwise."20

The fact that a loss is covered by insurance is apparently irrelevant, since the only concern of the Internal Revenue Service is that it was not
compensated for.
Conversely, however, it must be noted that none of the cases herein discussed relate to the cases under Code Section 162, regarding trade or business
expenses, which prohibit deduction if there exists a right of reimbursement."

"Id.
at 409.
"mFhis was recognized by Hills, 691 F.2d at 1000 and Miller, 733 F.2d at 403, citing J. Seidman,

Seidman's

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1961, 1018 (1938).

"See Levy v. Comm'r. 212 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1954); Burnett v. Comm'r. 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.

denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
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Temporary Regulations Issued
A.

GIANCARLI

Code Section 338 was enacted by TEFRA to replace the repealed
334(b)(2) liquidation procedure. Code Section 338 allows a corporation (purchaser) to elect to treat a qualified purchase of another corporation (target) as
an asset purchase.' If the election is made, the target is deemed to have sold all
of it's assets under a Section 337 12-month plan of complete liquidation. The
election rules are set out in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.338-iT, 2T, and
3T. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 changes the Section 338 election rules
significantly. The rule changes are effective retroactively where the acquisition
date is after August 31, 1982. The result is that a Section 338 election may
now be made by a purchaser that was formerly not eligible to make an election. On the other hand, a purchaser may be deemed to have made an election
with respect to a certain target, whereby a tax return (or amended return) must
be filed. The Internal Revenue Service issued temporary regulations on
September 6, 1984 (amending and redesignating the Temporary Regulations
issued on February 7, 1984) that deal with Section 338 elections. The
highlights of those regulations are as follows.
1. The purchasing corporation is required to make a statement of the election on Form 8023. The statement must: (i)contain the name, address, and employer identification number of the purchasing corporation and the target, (ii)
identify the election as a Section 338(g) election, (iii) specify the acquisition
date for elections filed after May 8, 1984, (iv) state the election was not barred
by the consistency requirement of Section 338(f)(2) for elections made after October 9, 1984, and (v) be signed by a person who states under penalties of perjury that he or she is authorized to make the election on behalf of the purchasing corporation.'
2. The purchasing corporation may elect under Section 338(g) only by filing, on or before the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in
which the acquisition date occurs (or, if after the 60th day, after the date of
publication of Reg. Section 1.338 - 4T). Under pre-'84 Act' law, Section
338(g)(1) required elections to be filed within 75 days after the acquisition date.
Since Reg. Section 1.338 -4T has not yet been issued, the time within which to
file the election is temporarily extended until 60 days after the date it is
published.'
3. Reg. Section 1.338 - 2T(d)(3) was added to provide guidance as to when
to treat acquisitions by several members of an affiliated group as made by one
corporation under Section 338(h)(8). Accordingly, when the election is made,
I.R.C. §338 (1985).
rTreas. Reg. §1.338-IT(d).
'Treas. Reg. §1.338-IT(c).
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the consistency rules of Section 338(f) are triggered, and all acquisitions of a
target's stock by members of an affiliated group within the specified 12 -month
period are aggregated, whereby, two or more corporations may file a single
statement of elections that contains the required information4 for each member
and is signed by an authorized person.' Also, note that under Section 338(f), a
purchasing corporation is barred from making an election with respect to a second target affiliate, if an election was not made with respect to the first target
within the specified 12-month period. On the other hand, under Reg. Section
1.338 - lT(c), a purchasing corporation will be deemed to have made a Section
338 election with respect to a second target affiliate, if the election was made
for the first target affiliate. 6
4. The target is to be immediately disaffiliated from the selling group
before the sale, which occurs at the close of the acquisition date.7 The result is
that the selling group is not permitted to use the tax attributes of the target,
i.e., the nonrecognition of gain or loss. Also note that the ultimate tax burden
is shifted to the purchasing corporation, i.e., target's tax liability resulting from
depreciation or investment credit recapture.
5. Reg. Section 1.388 - 1T(h)(1) waives, upon a showing of reasonable
cause, certain additions to tax that arise prior to the close of the 60th day after
the date Reg. Section 1.388 - 4T is published.
6. The regulations8 contain transitional election rules, whereby an election with respect to an acquisition made after August 31, 1980, and before
September 1, 1982, may be made if filed before September 17, 1984, showing
the deemed sales date.
7. Finally, the regulations9 contain miscellaneous rules under Section 224
of TEFRA relating to LIFO recapture provisions of the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980. The LIFO recapture amount is now reduced by onemillion dollars for a plan of liquidation adopted in 1982. Since an election was
not available in 1982, a timely Section 338 election causes any election that
could have been made in 1982 to be treated as if it were made in 1982 for purposes of the LIFO recapture.
The Service admits need for immediate guidance with respect to these
temporary regulations and should hopefully issue additional rulings or regulations in 1985 to further explain the Section 338 election.
'Treas. Reg. §1.338-IT(d)(l)(i).

'reas. Reg.
'Treas. Reg.
'Treas. Reg.
'Treas. Reg.
'Treas. Reg.

§1.338-IT(d)(l)(v).
§1.338-IT(c).
§1.338-IT(f)(l).
§i.338-2T.
§1.338-3T.
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Gross Income Inclusion: Appreciation of Restricted Stock Options
ANNETTE SKINNER

Under I.R.C. Section 83, an employee who purchases restricted stock options granted to him or her in connection with employment is required to
either (a) include in gross income for the taxable year in which the restriction
lapses, the stock's appreciation in value between the time of purchase and the
time the restriction lapsed, or (b) elect to include in gross income, for the taxable year in which the stock is purchased, the excess of the fair market value
on that date of purchase over the amount paid for the stock.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Alyes v. Commissioner' that unless Section 83(b)
is elected, Section 83(a) applies to all restricted stock that is transferred in connection with employment even if the taxpayer paid full fair market value.
In Alyes, the taxpayer purchased 40,000 shares of common stock as part
of an employment and stock purchase agreement with the employer company.
Alves paid ten cents per share and the parties stipulated that that was the fair
market value on the date of purchase. The company had an option to repurchase one-third of those shares if Alves left the company within five years and
it could repurchase another third if he left within four years. The remaining
one-third shares were unrestricted. Alves did not report, as ordinary income,
the appreciation in the fair market value of six dollars per share.' The five-year
shares appreciated to $3.43 per share. The Tax Court sustained the deficiency
determination of the Commissioner.4
The taxpayer presented four basic arguments in appealing the deficiency
determination. First, the taxpayer claimed that because he had paid fair market value on the date of the purchase the shares were issued as an investment
(which would take the transaction out of Section 83) rather than "in connection with the performance of services.' ' The Court of Appeals agreed that payment of fair market value is one factor to be considered in determining
whether stock is purchased as an investment. However, it held that other factors compelled the finding that the stock was issued in connection with employment. The court considered the fact that Alves purchased the stock at the
same time he signed his employment contract and that with only one exception, the company had issued stock only to its officers, directors, and
employees.
Secondly, the taxpayer argued that Section 83(a) should not extend to pur'l.R.C. §83 (1984).
2734 F.2d 478

(9th Cir. 1984).

'Id. at 480.
479 T.C. 864, 879 (1982) affd. 734 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984).
'Id. at 865.
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chases for fair market value, claiming that "in connection with the performance of services" implies that the employee is receiving compensation and if
fair market value is paid, there is no compensation. The court rebutted this
argument by pointing out that no reference is made to "compensation" in Section 83. Furthermore, if Congress had intended that Section 83 apply only to
restricted stock used to compensate employees, narrower language would have
been used.6
The taxpayer's third argument revolved around the theory that Section
83(a) and (b) apply only to bargain purchases, requiring inclusion of the excess
over the purchase price. The court held that Section 83 does not require a bargain element in a stock transaction for the transaction to be governed by Section 83. In fact, the Treasury Regulation specifically states: "[t]he fact that the
transferee has paid full value for the property transferred, realizing no bargain
element in the transaction, does not preclude the use of the [83(b)] elec-tion."'
The taxpayer's final argument was that the affirmative election required
by section 83(b) is "simply a trap for the unwary." The court unsympathetically observed that there are many tax laws which necessitate an affirmative election in order for a taxpayer to benefit from the various tax advantages.'

'Id. at 870.
'Treas. Reg. §1.83-2(a).
'79 T.C. at 873.
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